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The 1979 Iranian revolution ended up in a theocratic
regime that mobilized an important part of urban
youth for both the war against Iraq and the realiza-
tion of a utopian Islam. Two decades later, a new
type of cultural-political movement, with democrat-
ic tendencies, is emerging and is founded mainly on
three groups: intellectuals, university students, and
w o m e n .
New Social
Movements in Iran
Throughout the 1990s, a post-Islamist intel-
lectual movement has been developing in
Iran that challenges the foundations of the
Islamic Republic as conceived by Imam
Khomeini in his theory of velayat-e faqih ( T h e
Guardianship of the doctor of the law) which
legitimizes an Islamic theocracy within a
closed political system, despite the exis-
tence of universal voting rights recognized
by the Constitution.
The intellectuals
Islamist intellectuals, such as ShariÕati and
Khomeini, advocated a closed system in
which politics and religion are directly
linked, whereas the post-Islamist intellectu-
als try to dissociate religion from politics.
These new intellectuals are by and large in
their fifties. At the time of the Revolution,
most of them were strong advocates of revo-
lutionary Islam and some had extreme leftist
tendencies. For example, Abdolkarim
Soroush was a revolutionary who participat-
ed, at least initially, in the ÔCultural Revolu-
tionÕ which resulted in the closure of univer-
sities. The same holds for Mohsen Makhmal-
baf, the filmmaker who had fought against
the Shah and who, after the revolution, was
a radical Islamist. These two, like many oth-
ers, have now changed sides and advocate a
tolerant vision of Islam in contrast to the
closed political field imposed by radical Is-
lamists. They contest the strongly advocated
notion held by Islamist thinkers, above all by
ShariÕati, of the close association between
politics and religion that gave birth to the Is-
lamic Revolution. In the 1990s, numerous Is-
lamist intellectuals began to gradually
change perspectives and to renounce the
revolutionary Islamist ideology.
Lay or clerical intellectuals, such as Soroush,
Mojtahed-Shabestari, Ayatollah Montazeri,
Mohsen Kadivar, and Eshkavari challenged
the Islamic theocracy in the name of Islam it-
self. These intellectuals split into many
groups: the first one consists of advocates of
a purely spiritual Islam, who challenge the
velayat-e faqih in the name of Islam. Accord-
ing to this group, the politicization of Islam
only discredits the faith. The second group
leans toward a limited, purely legislative, in-
tervention of Islam in society. According to
Kadivar and Montazeri, society must orga-
nize itself, without the intervention of the
faqih. The latter has only the right of supervi-
sion (n e z a r a t), and not of political domina-
tion (v e l a y a t) over society. The third group
comprises secular intellectuals who reason
in terms of modernity with no reference (or
simply a purely instrumental one) to Islam.
All three groups agree that the existing
regime is breaking the Constitution (1979-
80), and that the law should be respected by
the state and all other groups. Despite their
diversity, the post-Islamist intellectuals are
also united in their implicit rejection of the
velayat-e faqih, in the approval of Ôcivil soci-
etyÕ (or what some of them call Ôreligious civil
societyÕ), and the will to assert the rule of
law. This movement has access to journals
and publications, most of which have been
banned or attacked by violent pressure
groups, and the judiciary.
These intellectuals have a deep influence
on the young generation of university stu-
dents, who read their writings and attend
their debates at universities, despite all re-
pressive attempts at intimidation, including
imprisonment and, in some cases, execution.
The studentsÕ movement
The students, who form the second social
movement in Iran, are largely inspired by the
post-Islamist intellectuals, but their de-
mands are not limited to those of the intel-
lectuals. The latter demand the freedom of
expression and the widening of social partic-
ipation in the political sphere, a demand also
shared by the young people. For example, a
student association like the Daftar-e Tahkim-
e Vahdat, which was a revolutionary and mil-
itant force representing the Islamist univer-
sity students until the first half of the 1990s,
has changed sides, defending Khatami and
his reforms against the pressure groups and
the conservatives.
The young generation comprises the nu-
meric majority, more than 60% of the popu-
lation being below 24 years of age. Most of
the youth did not experience the ShahÕs
reign. One of the fundamental demands of
this movement is that of freedom in daily life
Ð freedom of dress, freedom to meet those
of the opposite sex in public space, and the
freedom to participate in the modern world,
especially in its diverse consumerist aspects
Ð without being harassed by the special Is-
lamic police who guard against overstep-
ping the forbidden boundaries of proper Is-
lamic conduct (such as the Bassij, Komite,
Monkerat, etc.).
Before Khatami, young people were con-
stantly pursued and harassed everywhere, in
universities, classrooms, streets, and in their
own cars by these repressive bodies and
they suffered continuous humiliation at
their hands. Since KhatamiÕs election, there
is some relaxation of this state of surveil-
lance, but many feel that this is a precarious
freedom as the vigilantes can harass them
on certain days, while on other days they are
left alone. And while there is still no guaran-
tee of security, the most humiliating mea-
sures against them have been lifted.
The Islamic regime, which used to be the
basis of the collective identity of the young
revolutionary generation of the 1980s, has
been transformed over time into a power
opposed to the youth. It is now feared and
despised for the violence and repressive
rigour it imposes on the new generation. 
The womenÕs movement
Finally, there is also a new womenÕs move-
ment, which can be best understood by refer-
ring back to the Revolution, when for the first
time in Iranian history, womenÕs presence was
crucial in street demonstrations. (In the most
massive of these, a third of the participants
were women.) Nevertheless, at the time, the
vast majority of these women had no specific
demands based on their gender. Women in-
tellectuals were mostly influenced by Marx-
ism and maintained the corresponding no-
tion that once the proletariat would come to
rule, womenÕs issues would be automatically
resolved. As for Islamist women, they be-
lieved that Islam would adequately solve
womenÕs problems by re-establishing the
communitarian harmony destroyed by the
monarchy. Consequently, there were no
specifically gender-based demands among
the vast majority of women demonstrators in
the 1978-1979 Revolution.
However, the onset of the Islamic regime
brought with it serious restrictions on
women. Primarily, they were forbidden to oc-
cupy certain administrative positions, and
those who worked for the state under a con-
tract were laid off or did not have their con-
tracts renewed. With the establishment of Is-
lamic laws, numerous other obstacles were
imposed on women, diminishing their equal -
ity of status: exclusion from certain jobs (such
as being a judge); inequality of divorce (the
man can divorce his wife, but not vice versa);
inequality of guardianship of children after di-
vorce (the man can keep male children after
the age of 2, and female children after the age
of 9); unequal laws of inheritance (women re-
ceive one-half of a manÕs share); and the in-
equality in the face of justice (a womanÕs tes-
timony counts as half of a manÕs).
The womenÕs movement in the 1990s
began on the precept that the installation of
the Islamic regime had led to the regression
of womenÕs rights on many levels. At the
same time, in fields such as education and
health, womenÕs presence has improved. Lit-
eracy has increased among both sexes, and
womenÕs access to modernity, at least in the
field of education, is approaching that of
men. Much more than in the past, girls in rural
areas have access to schools. There is thus an
increasing equalization of access to moderni-
ty for women in schools and universities.
However, once they enter the labour market,
they find themselves excluded by social
mores, by men, but also by Islamic legislation.
Increasing modernization brings them intel-
lectually and psychologically ever closer to
men, making the legal denial of access to
equality incomprehensible, even scandalous
in their view. As long as womenÕs social and
cultural lives were different from those of
men, this inequality was perceived as ema-
nating from ÔnaturalÕ differences. But now, the
intellectual status and living conditions of
women have changed, especially among the
urban middle and lower middle classes,
where many women work so as to maintain a
decent standard of living in their household.
The legal inequality becomes all the more in-
tolerable with the increase in economic hard-
ship faced by those in the urban areas, but
also by the vast majority. Despite the difficul-
ty in obtaining equal pay for equal work,
womenÕs incomes are vital and sometimes
even necessary to pay for childrenÕs basic ed-
ucation.
WomenÕs political rights of citizenship are
theoretically almost equal to those of the
men. On the one hand, a womanÕs vote in
elections, or any other exercise in citizenship,
counts the same as that of a man. In the par-
liament, their rights and voices count the
same as any male deputy. However, when it
comes to family law, the inequality becomes
flagrant: a woman cannot travel without the
explicit permission of her husband, she can
be divorced without any convincing reason
and can be denied the right of keeping her
children after divorce. Nonetheless, some of
these measures have changed recently due to
womenÕs intervention in the public sphere
and in the Parliament.
Before the revolution, secular and Islamist
women were opposed to one another, but
now, facing similar disillusionment with legal
inequalities, they are moving closer together.
Towards a new civil society
These intellectualsÕ, university studentsÕ
and womenÕs movements, while being dis-
tinct, do have several things in common.
They renounce revolutionary violence and
are willing to construct a society based on di-
alogue and compromise. On the one hand,
since KhatamiÕs election in 1997, the ab-
solute majority of the people support the de-
mocratic turn. On the other hand, a signifi-
cant degree of political power remains in the
hands of anti-democratic conservatives, in-
cluding: the juridical branch and the impor-
tant office of the Supreme Leader of the Rev-
olution, which is in the hands of Ayatollah
Khamenei; the Revolutionary Foundations,
which have access to significant sums of cap-
ital lying outside government control; the
Counsel of the Guardians, who can veto all
the laws that seem un-Islamic to them; and
the Office of the Superior Interests of the Is-
lamic Regime, which arbitrates between the
Parliament and the Counsel of the Guardians
in case of disagreement between them.
Thus, we are faced with a post-Islamist soci-
ety, with a divided power structure whose es-
sential instruments nevertheless continue to
be in the hands of the conservatives, while all
the groups fighting for the opening of Iranian
society are losing patience as the promised
reforms run into institutional obstacles. u
